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Industrial Policy Since Love Canal
Alice Kryzan*
The time period in which the Superfund statute was passed was
an emotional one. There were three main types of reactions that
occurred. First, industry reaction, in general, was one of skepticism
about the claims of personal injury, harm or property damage. Second,
there was a real sense of outrage at the reaction to industry that was
created by the Love Canal situation. People who had viewed
themselves as responsible, caring members ofthe community were now
seen as outlaws. Third, there was a high degree of concern about the
implications of the new liability scheme that was being talked about
and which was eventually implemented by Superfund. I think that, over
the years, industry has become resigned to public perceptions about the
issues of hazardous waste disposal and the political capital that can be
made by politicians from responding dramatically to those concerns.
However, these three elements, skepticism, outrage and concern, still
color the response to these issues.
Prior to 1978, industrial waste disposal practices, demon-
strated across the country and especially in New York State, were
very primitive. However, they were entirely legal. While Love Canal
was in use, waste disposal was an open and, some would say,
notorious activity. There was nothing to hide because nobody was
doing anything wrong. That was certainly the feeling of the company
at the time, as well as the feeling of the company throughout the
course of the litigation.
Indeed, just several weeks ago, as I was involved in cost
recovery Superfund litigation, I found myself writing a brief
describing the industry standards and practices for hazardous waste
disposal throughout the 50s, 60s, 70s, and 80s. In 1982, the waste
disposal regulations covering the disposal of industrial hazardous
waste in New York State were one and a one-half pages long. No "L
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J" collection systems were required; two feet of dirt thrown over the
top of the landfill was deemed adequate cover. That would have been
about ten years after Love Canal. During the course of the litigation,
Hooker Chemical Corporation maintained that its disposal practices
were in advance of industry and government concern about the
environment. The State of New York and the federal government
brought claims against Hooker and Occidental before Superfund was
passed; those cases were amended to include the Superfund causes of
action. One of the claims the State of New York made was that
Occidental or Hooker should be held liable for punitive damages as
a result oftheir disposal practices at Love Canal. At a very basic level,
it's hard to imagine someone being guilty of the extreme conduct that
requires the imposition of punitive damages when there were 1,600
waste sites of a similar nature in western New York. Nevertheless, the
State pursued that claim. In 1994, the ruling District Court wrote in its
decision about Hooker's actions at Love Canal, in terms of the
disposal practices: "The overwhelming weight of evidence given by
experts in the field of solid waste disposal during the relevant time
period shows that Hooker comported with, and often exceeded the
standards demanded by statute, proposed by health and other
government officials, or followed by others in the industry."
So imagine yourself, a law-abiding citizen, finding yourself
being castigated for practices that were entirely legal and ahead of
industry standards at the time you were engaged in them. I think your
response to that kind of attack would be one of anger or outrage.
To further illustrate this point about the nature ofpast disposal
practices, the court referred to a New York State Department of
Environment Conservation and Active Hazardous Waste Disposal
report which discussed a site, adjacent to a school, owned by the New
York State Department of Health where spent solvents were poured
down a pipe and into a disposal pit. This activity occurred over a
period of years. Even though the soil was considered "very dense,"
high levels of solvents were discovered in a monitoring well located
on the school property. Evidently, when the Health Department began
disposal around 1950, it believed that the solvents could be disposed
of safely in this tight soil. In 1971, the State found it had made a
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mistake; some solvents had seeped out of the well. The comparison
with what occurred at Love Canal is very striking.
Entirely legal practices were made the subject of a very
draconian liability scheme. What do we do with hazardous wastes
today? We bury them in the ground. Twenty years after Love Canal,
the principal form of disposal of hazardous waste chemicals is land
disposal. Certainly, the disposal occurs in facilities that are
engineered to more exacting standards than a place like the Love
Canal. Nevertheless, as you've heard here today, people oppose the
incineration ofthese wastes and certainly oppose the disposal ofthese
wastes in streams and waterways, which was the way to do it before
land disposal. Hence, twenty years later, land disposal is still the
preferred method of disposal.
Another reason for skepticism about the health claims at Love
Canal was knowledge. When Love Canal burst upon the scene the
human health effects of chronic exposures to low levels of toxic
chemicals were not only unknown, but also not a significant area of
industry or scientific concern. Most data and all safeguards were
directed to acute and intensive exposures of the type to be expected
of industrial workers or the kind of catastrophic events, which while
rare, certainly adversely impact nearby residents.
Coming out of a period of post-war growth, experimentation
and progress, the prevailing view was that chemicals were produced
to enhance the standard of living by increasing agricultural
production, decreasing disease, and otherwise developing products
which would make our lives better. Indeed, many of the chemicals
that were found in the homes surrounding Love Canal at the time the
analytical work was done were common constituents of everyday
household or consumer products. Notthe least among them were such
items as nail polish, which contains toluene. Another common
unfortunate pollutant in households is cigarette smoke, which
contains polycyclins, aromatic hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide and
formaldehyde. Also, shampoo for head lice, still on the market today,
contains lindane. How could people be claiming that Love Canal was
the source of pollutant chemicals in their homes by virtue of the
household products they use?
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Another reason for the source of skepticism was the
ambiguous mechanism for the delivery of toxic chemicals. Everyone
at Love Canal was on a public drinking water supply. Nobody
ingested these chemicals through the drinking water. How was it
getting into their homes? How could the landfill have contaminated
the air within people's homes? Certainly, inhalation would be another
common form of exposure that would be of great concern. There
really weren't any answers to these questions. But as facts became
available, it became clear that there were problems involved with
trying to match health effects with alleged exposures.
Principally, there were no scientific mechanisms for matching
health effects with alleged exposures. The science of measuring chemi-
cals in air and water was very primitive at the time. Originally, the first
level of air testing done in the basements of the first ring of homes at
Love Canal showed higher levels of chemicals than the second or third
ring of homes. One plausible explanation for the decreasing levels of
concentrations of chemicals was, as propounded by some, decreasing
contamination as one moved outward from the Canal.
Another equally plausible and more scientific explanation was
that when chemicals in the first ring of homes were measured, the
equipment used was more crude, and the scientists less technically
equipped to do the testing. In those situations, the results that get
reported tend to be higher. As equipment and sophistication
improved, levels closer to reality began to emerge in the readings.
Nevertheless, there were still no signs to link the very small levels
with any kind of health effect. The other problem that emerged was
in testing the air. When the air in the homes was tested there were no
controls on the data collected in the basements. The basements were
not emptied of common household products that could cause cross-
contamination of the equipment and the analytical sampling devices
were not secured against tampering. I know that it verges on the
incredible for me to suggest to you that people tampered with these
testing devices, but it was known to have occurred.
Health studies were completed and some hysteria ensued.
However, none of these health studies ever demonstrated a connec-
tion between the chemicals of Love Canal and the illnesses that were
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reported. There was no evidence of increased rates of cancer,
respiratory ailments, nervous disorders, liver damage, or any other
human ailment among residents of Love Canal. There was never any
credible scientific evidence that inhabitants of Love Canal
experienced higher rates of genetic damage, miscarriage, or birth
defects than any other population in the United States. This is the
result of subsequent analysis of the data that was collected. For the
purposes of my talk, what it means is that the initial skepticism that
people in industry felt about these claims appeared to be borne out by
the scientific data. Nevertheless, we still hear about a correlation
between health effects and low levels of exposure; even though the
mechanism for exposure and the actual levels of exposure is
unknown, and there were no demonstrated health effects shown from
all the studies conducted.
The tenants who lived in a low-income housing project
directly to the west of the Canal were not included in a number of the
health studies done, certainly not the early studies. There was a
reason. They were not excluded out of discrimination against there
low-income status, but their low-income status was a factor. The
Love Canal area used by the federal government for purposes of
declaring a disaster was the same area delineated by statute by the
State of New York to define the area for which property tax relief
would be given to surrounding property owners who were complain-
ing principally about declining housing values, as a result of their
proximity to Love Canal. So it began as an effort by the State of New
York to give property tax reliefto home owners to encourage them to
stay in their homes around Love Canal. The tenants were excluded
from this area originally, because they did not pay property taxes.
The call for forms of liability to redress these grievances was
considered virtually draconian at the time. I am not aware of any other
time in our jurisprudence that we combined retroactive, strict joint
and several liability for actions taken by any individual or corporation
without any type of reasonable defense. The rule of law became: if a
corporation or business deposited hazardous waste in a landfill, they
could, and would, be held liable for the total cost of the cleanup,
regardless of the amount deposited. It was a terrific liability scheme
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in the sense that it was almost impossible for the government to
misidentify and hold companies liable for cleanup at inactive
hazardous waste sites.
Given that liability scheme, which some may think was fair
and deserving, it's not surprising that sentiments of this type were
expressed by Dr. Elizabeth Whelan in a book called Toxic Terror.'
Dr. Whelan is the Executive Director of the American Council on
Science and Health. These extreme words provide the more extreme
view of this picture:
[Love Canal] serves well as the focal point for an
expos6 of the questionable, indeed, immoral and
dishonest tactics of those individuals who term
themselves "environmentalists" but are in fact mostly
a group of anti-corporation, anti-technology advo-
cates. Love Canal is a classic story of half truths,
distorted historical facts, unprecedented media
exaggeration and misguided government intervention,
all of which caused substantially more human upset
and misery than did even the most toxic of Hooker's
chemicals. In dealing with Love Canal, the environ-
mentalists and their colleagues in the media and the
government, acted about as ethically as someone
falsely crying fire in a crowded theater.2
Acknowledging the extreme view, I think that it is not too
difficult to see why rational discourse on these topics was impossible
for a very long time. The gulf between industry on the one hand, and
government and environmentalists on the other hand, has been
extremely wide and deep from the outset. Even environmentalists do
not count government on their side of the equation. In some instances,
environmentalists classify government as no better or no worse than
I ELIZABETH M. WHELAN, Toxic TERROR (1985).
2 Id. at 90.
INDUSTRIAL POLICY
industry. Industry tends not to view itself as "being in bed" with
government; ironically, it probably views the alliance in exactly the
opposite way.
So what has industry's response been to the passage of
Superfund statute, which has truly set the tone and tenor of cleaning
these inactive hazardous waste sites? I don't think there's any
question. The response has been two-fold. Externally, it opposes the
statute. Internally, it tries to control the cost imposed by the statute.
I think it's very important to differentiate between past waste disposal
practices, which Love Canal resulted from, and current activities, in
terms of production, generation, and disposal of waste created by
production. After 1980, most major corporations did not engage in
the illegitimate land-filling of hazardous waste that created Love
Canal, largely because statutes were passed and enforced that
prohibited this method of disposal.
In general, larger corporations responded first to the proposed
controls by seeking compliance. Fines for criminal and civil
enforcement actions were quite high and the external costs imposed
by the statutes and the government encouraged industry to comply.
Smaller companies and individual businesses, lacking the luxury of
sufficient dollars to comply with the law, did not necessarily fall into
step quite as quickly. A recent article appeared on the front page of
the Buffalo News regarding the deadline for the removal of
underground storage tanks. It described how businesses were given
ten years to comply with the statute because it was so costly and
onerous to do so. Many small business owners, like many early large
corporations, believed themselves to be above the law but have
slowly come into compliance.
In terms of the Superfund statute the situation is different.
New inactive hazardous waste sites are no longer being created and
most of the very serious sites are being discovered and dealt with
under the current liability scheme. My personal opinion is that
industry's efforts to lobby for legislative changes or reform of the
Superfund statute are probably largely misguided in the sense that it's
not a growing problem; their resources might be better spent dealing
with regulation of ongoing practices. Nevertheless, they continue to
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challenge the statue in court and lobby for exemptions to the liability
scheme. The exception created for lenders has been successful. Banks
have been held liable at Superfund sites and only recently are they
able to get exempted from the statute. However, people, like scrap
dealers, have not. There are other industry groups, like scrap dealers,
who don't believe they should be covered by the Superfund statute.
I suspect that they will never be successful in getting removed or
exempted from liability, no matter how long they try. So, while there
is this continuing effort to mold the statute, I think most companies
now are trying to control the costs associated with dealing with this
problem. In 1995, government numbers have estimated the cost of
Super Fund to private corporations at $11.3 billion.
One-third of the costs attributed to cleanup are related to
transactions costs. Corporations are essentially trying to minimize
transaction costs. They are looking at remedial, available technologies
that permanently deal with the problem of waste disposal in less
expensive and more innovative methods. Looking at the different
kinds of models to control legal costs, we find standardized forms or
approaches in Superfund litigation. Many companies prefer
alternative dispute resolution, as if a lot of lawyers in a room arguing
without rules will somehow be cheaper, faster and more efficient than
a bunch of lawyers in the room arguing under the rules set down by
the federal courts. The other effort is spent trying to control remedia-
tion costs. There are not many technologies that can be applied. The
question is how to get through that process as efficiently as possible
so that costs are not astronomical or inappropriate.
Even though the sites have been largely identified, I think that
it is worth pointing out a couple of things about Love Canal and the
situation today. First, the remediation put into effect at Love Canal
was effectuated within two years. The remedial fix proposed is
essentially in operation today. On the other hand, since Superfund has
been passed, I would venture that not one Superfund site in this
country was cleaned up in two years. When I spoke of skepticism of
the problem and the process, you will understand me when I tell you
that I'm currently working on two Superfund sites, both of which
were part of the original National Priority List (NPL). One has just
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completed its five-year remedy implemented by the government.
After fifteen years it was determined that the fix chosen was
compounding the problem instead of solving it. The other site is a
landfill that went on the NPL in 1980 and has still not been fully
characterized. That means we don't know what the remedy is going
to be, so we don't know that it's going to be put in place. Operations
at the landfill closed around 1978. So the chosen process has not
worked necessarily well in terms of expeditiously cleaning up these
sites. However, I do think it has worked very well in terms of finding
people to pay for the costs of cleanup. Generally the corporations in
municipalities where the landfills have been used by the corporations
pay the costs of cleanup. This is a general construct of practices
between then, Love Canal, and now.

